wok-6.x diff libwrap/stuff/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch @ rev 22548
updated blender (2.81 -> 2.81a)
| author | Hans-G?nter Theisgen |
|---|---|
| date | Sat Jan 04 08:45:04 2020 +0100 (2020-01-04) |
| parents | |
| children |
line diff
1.1 --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 1.2 +++ b/libwrap/stuff/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch Sat Jan 04 08:45:04 2020 +0100 1.3 @@ -0,0 +1,1035 @@ 1.4 +Submitted By: Tushar Teredesai <tushar@linuxfromscratch.org> 1.5 +Date: 2003-10-04 1.6 +Initial Package Version: 7.6 1.7 +Origin: http://archives.linuxfromscratch.org/mail-archives/blfs-dev/2003-January/001960.html 1.8 +Description: The patch was created from the tcp_wrappers modified package by Mark Heerdink. 1.9 +This patch provides the following improvements: 1.10 + * Install libwrap.so along with libwrap.a. 1.11 + * Create an install target for tcp_wrappers. 1.12 + * Compilation and security fixes. 1.13 + * Documentation fixes. 1.14 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 1.15 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600 1.16 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500 1.17 +@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ 1.18 ++GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h) 1.19 ++ 1.20 + # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20 1.21 + 1.22 ++# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable 1.23 ++HOSTNAME = 1.24 ++ 1.25 + what: 1.26 + @echo 1.27 + @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" 1.28 +@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ 1.29 + @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" 1.30 + @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" 1.31 + @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" 1.32 +- @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" 1.33 ++ @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" 1.34 + @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" 1.35 + @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" 1.36 + @echo " uts215 uxp" 1.37 +@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ 1.38 + # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx 1.39 + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc 1.40 + # 1.41 +-# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX 1.42 +-#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin 1.43 ++# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux 1.44 ++REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin 1.45 + # 1.46 + # BSD 4.4 1.47 + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec 1.48 +@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ 1.49 + LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ 1.50 + EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all 1.51 + 1.52 ++ifneq ($(GLIBC),0) 1.53 ++MYLIB=-lnsl 1.54 ++endif 1.55 ++ 1.56 + linux: 1.57 + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ 1.58 +- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ 1.59 +- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all 1.60 ++ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ 1.61 ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ 1.62 ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" 1.63 ++ 1.64 ++gnu: 1.65 ++ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ 1.66 ++ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ 1.67 ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ 1.68 ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" 1.69 + 1.70 + # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. 1.71 + hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: 1.72 +@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ 1.73 + # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module 1.74 + # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). 1.75 + 1.76 +-AUX_OBJ= setenv.o 1.77 ++#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o 1.78 + #AUX_OBJ= environ.o 1.79 + #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o 1.80 + 1.81 +@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ 1.82 + # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work 1.83 + # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. 1.84 + 1.85 +-BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK 1.86 ++BUGS = 1.87 ++#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK 1.88 + #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG 1.89 + #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG 1.90 + 1.91 +@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ 1.92 + # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following 1.93 + # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. 1.94 + # 1.95 +-#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP 1.96 ++NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP 1.97 + 1.98 + ############################################################### 1.99 + # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() 1.100 +@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ 1.101 + # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions 1.102 + # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). 1.103 + # 1.104 +-#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. 1.105 ++STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. 1.106 + 1.107 + ################################################################ 1.108 + # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records 1.109 +@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ 1.110 + # 1.111 + # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. 1.112 + 1.113 +-FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use 1.114 ++FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use 1.115 + 1.116 + # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. 1.117 + 1.118 +@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ 1.119 + # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname 1.120 + # lookups altogether, see the next section. 1.121 + 1.122 +-PARANOID= -DPARANOID 1.123 ++#PARANOID= -DPARANOID 1.124 + 1.125 + ######################################## 1.126 + # Optional: turning off hostname lookups 1.127 +@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ 1.128 + # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid 1.129 + # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. 1.130 + 1.131 +-HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME 1.132 ++#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME 1.133 + 1.134 + ############################################# 1.135 + # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking 1.136 +@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ 1.137 + # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, 1.138 + # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. 1.139 + # 1.140 +-# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS 1.141 ++KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS 1.142 + 1.143 + ## End configuration options 1.144 + ############################ 1.145 + 1.146 + # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. 1.147 + 1.148 ++CC = gcc 1.149 + SHELL = /bin/sh 1.150 +-.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c 1.151 ++.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c 1.152 ++ 1.153 ++SOMAJOR = 0 1.154 ++SOMINOR = 7.6 1.155 ++ 1.156 ++LIB = libwrap.a 1.157 ++SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) 1.158 ++SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) 1.159 ++SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so 1.160 ++SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap 1.161 + 1.162 +-CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ 1.163 ++shared/%.o: %.c 1.164 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ 1.165 ++ 1.166 ++CFLAGS = -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ 1.167 + $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ 1.168 + -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ 1.169 + -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ 1.170 + $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ 1.171 + $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) 1.172 + 1.173 ++SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) 1.174 ++SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT 1.175 ++ 1.176 + LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ 1.177 + hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ 1.178 + $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ 1.179 + update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o 1.180 + 1.181 ++SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ)); 1.182 ++ 1.183 + FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o 1.184 + 1.185 + KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ 1.186 +@@ -684,46 +719,80 @@ 1.187 + refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ 1.188 + scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS 1.189 + 1.190 +-LIB = libwrap.a 1.191 +- 1.192 +-all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk 1.193 ++all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) 1.194 + 1.195 + # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. 1.196 + 1.197 + config-check: 1.198 + @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } 1.199 +- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ 1.200 +- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ 1.201 +- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ 1.202 +- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ 1.203 ++ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ 1.204 ++ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ 1.205 ++ then rm cflags.new ; \ 1.206 ++ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ 1.207 + fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null 1.208 ++ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi 1.209 + 1.210 + $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) 1.211 + rm -f $(LIB) 1.212 + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) 1.213 + -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) 1.214 + 1.215 +-tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) 1.216 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 1.217 ++$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) 1.218 ++ rm -f $(SHLIB) 1.219 ++ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) 1.220 ++ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) 1.221 ++ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) 1.222 ++ 1.223 ++tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) 1.224 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 1.225 + 1.226 +-miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) 1.227 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 1.228 ++miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB) 1.229 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 1.230 + 1.231 +-safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) 1.232 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 1.233 ++safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) 1.234 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 1.235 + 1.236 + TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o 1.237 + 1.238 +-tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) 1.239 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) 1.240 ++tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) 1.241 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) 1.242 + 1.243 +-try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) 1.244 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 1.245 ++try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) 1.246 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 1.247 + 1.248 + TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o 1.249 + 1.250 +-tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) 1.251 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) 1.252 ++tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) 1.253 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) 1.254 ++ 1.255 ++install: install-lib install-bin install-dev 1.256 ++ 1.257 ++install-lib: 1.258 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ 1.259 ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) 1.260 ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO)) 1.261 ++ 1.262 ++install-bin: 1.263 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 1.264 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 1.265 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 1.266 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 1.267 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 1.268 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 1.269 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 1.270 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 1.271 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 1.272 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 1.273 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ 1.274 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ 1.275 ++ 1.276 ++install-dev: 1.277 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/ 1.278 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/ 1.279 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ 1.280 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3 1.281 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3 1.282 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3 1.283 + 1.284 + shar: $(KIT) 1.285 + @shar $(KIT) 1.286 +@@ -739,7 +808,8 @@ 1.287 + 1.288 + clean: 1.289 + rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ 1.290 +- cflags 1.291 ++ cflags libwrap*.so* 1.292 ++ rm -rf shared 1.293 + 1.294 + tidy: clean 1.295 + chmod -R a+r . 1.296 +@@ -885,5 +955,6 @@ 1.297 + update.o: mystdarg.h 1.298 + update.o: tcpd.h 1.299 + vfprintf.o: cflags 1.300 ++weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h 1.301 + workarounds.o: cflags 1.302 + workarounds.o: tcpd.h 1.303 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 1.304 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500 1.305 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.306 +@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@ 1.307 + #ifdef IP_OPTIONS 1.308 + unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; 1.309 + char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; 1.310 ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) 1.311 + int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; 1.312 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.313 ++ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf); 1.314 ++ int ipproto; 1.315 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.316 + struct protoent *ip; 1.317 + int fd = request->fd; 1.318 + unsigned int opt; 1.319 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 1.320 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600 1.321 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.322 +@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ 1.323 + hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library 1.324 + .SH SYNOPSIS 1.325 + .nf 1.326 +-#include "tcpd.h" 1.327 ++#include <tcpd.h> 1.328 + 1.329 + extern int allow_severity; 1.330 + extern int deny_severity; 1.331 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 1.332 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600 1.333 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.334 +@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ 1.335 + impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a 1.336 + quick introduction. 1.337 + .PP 1.338 +-An extended version of the access control language is described in the 1.339 +-\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at 1.340 +-program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. 1.341 ++The extended version of the access control language is described in the 1.342 ++\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes 1.343 ++the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR 1.344 + .PP 1.345 + In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a 1.346 + network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of 1.347 +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ 1.348 + character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are 1.349 + easier to edit. 1.350 + .IP \(bu 1.351 +-Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. 1.352 ++Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored. 1.353 + This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables 1.354 + are easier to read. 1.355 + .IP \(bu 1.356 +@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ 1.357 + .SH PATTERNS 1.358 + The access control language implements the following patterns: 1.359 + .IP \(bu 1.360 +-A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if 1.361 ++A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if 1.362 + the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For 1.363 +-example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name 1.364 +-`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. 1.365 ++example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name 1.366 ++`wzv.win.tue.nl'. 1.367 + .IP \(bu 1.368 +-A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if 1.369 ++A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if 1.370 + its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the 1.371 +-pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the 1.372 ++pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the 1.373 + Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). 1.374 + .IP \(bu 1.375 +-A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS 1.376 ++A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS 1.377 + (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host 1.378 + member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported 1.379 + for daemon process names or for client user names. 1.380 + .IP \(bu 1.381 +-An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a 1.382 +-`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the 1.383 +-bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask 1.384 +-pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the 1.385 +-range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. 1.386 ++An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a 1.387 ++`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the 1.388 ++bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask 1.389 ++pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the 1.390 ++range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'. 1.391 ++.IP \(bu 1.392 ++A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file 1.393 ++name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name 1.394 ++or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is 1.395 ++zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns 1.396 ++separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere 1.397 ++a host name or address pattern can be used. 1.398 + .SH WILDCARDS 1.399 + The access control language supports explicit wildcards: 1.400 + .IP ALL 1.401 +@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ 1.402 + .ne 6 1.403 + .SH OPERATORS 1.404 + .IP EXCEPT 1.405 +-Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct 1.406 ++Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct 1.407 + matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches 1.408 + \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in 1.409 + client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control 1.410 +-language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' 1.411 +-would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. 1.412 ++language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' 1.413 ++would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'. 1.414 + .br 1.415 + .ne 6 1.416 + .SH SHELL COMMANDS 1.417 + If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that 1.418 + command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section). 1.419 + The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard 1.420 +-input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' 1.421 ++input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&' 1.422 + at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has 1.423 + completed. 1.424 + .PP 1.425 +@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ 1.426 + .IP %u 1.427 + The client user name (or "unknown"). 1.428 + .IP %% 1.429 +-Expands to a single `%\' character. 1.430 ++Expands to a single `%' character. 1.431 + .PP 1.432 + Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by 1.433 + underscores. 1.434 +@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ 1.435 + less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the 1.436 + client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much 1.437 + harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that 1.438 +-the client\'s IDENT server is lying. 1.439 ++the client's IDENT server is lying. 1.440 + .PP 1.441 +-Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. 1.442 ++Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. 1.443 + .SH EXAMPLES 1.444 + The language is flexible enough that different types of access control 1.445 + policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language 1.446 +@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ 1.447 + .br 1.448 + ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu 1.449 + .PP 1.450 +-The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' 1.451 ++The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.' 1.452 + in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP 1.453 + netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the 1.454 + \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of 1.455 +@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ 1.456 + /etc/hosts.deny: 1.457 + .in +3 1.458 + .nf 1.459 +-in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ 1.460 +- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & 1.461 ++in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ 1.462 ++ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) & 1.463 + .fi 1.464 + .PP 1.465 + The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be 1.466 +@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ 1.467 + capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not 1.468 + terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter> 1.469 + expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails 1.470 +-that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. 1.471 ++that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. 1.472 + .SH FILES 1.473 + .na 1.474 + .nf 1.475 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 1.476 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600 1.477 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.478 +@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ 1.479 + } 1.480 + } 1.481 + 1.482 ++/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ 1.483 ++ 1.484 ++static int hostfile_match(path, host) 1.485 ++char *path; 1.486 ++struct hosts_info *host; 1.487 ++{ 1.488 ++ char tok[BUFSIZ]; 1.489 ++ int match = NO; 1.490 ++ FILE *fp; 1.491 ++ 1.492 ++ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { 1.493 ++ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) 1.494 ++ /* void */ ; 1.495 ++ fclose(fp); 1.496 ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { 1.497 ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); 1.498 ++ } 1.499 ++ return (match); 1.500 ++} 1.501 ++ 1.502 + /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ 1.503 + 1.504 + static int host_match(tok, host) 1.505 +@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ 1.506 + tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ 1.507 + return (NO); 1.508 + #endif 1.509 ++ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ 1.510 ++ return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); 1.511 + } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ 1.512 + char *name = eval_hostname(host); 1.513 + return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); 1.514 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 1.515 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600 1.516 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.517 +@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ 1.518 + Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after 1.519 + performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5) 1.520 + manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr 1.521 +-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the 1.522 ++connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the 1.523 + conversation with the client host. Example: 1.524 + .sp 1.525 + .nf 1.526 + .ti +3 1.527 +-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & 1.528 ++spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) & 1.529 + .fi 1.530 + .sp 1.531 + executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger 1.532 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 1.533 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c 1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600 1.534 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.535 +@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ 1.536 + #ifdef LOG_CRON 1.537 + "cron", LOG_CRON, 1.538 + #endif 1.539 ++#ifdef LOG_FTP 1.540 ++ "ftp", LOG_FTP, 1.541 ++#endif 1.542 + #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 1.543 + "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, 1.544 + #endif 1.545 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 1.546 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c 1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600 1.547 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.548 +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ 1.549 + #include <string.h> 1.550 + 1.551 + extern int errno; 1.552 +-#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED 1.553 ++#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) 1.554 + extern char *sys_errlist[]; 1.555 + extern int sys_nerr; 1.556 + #endif 1.557 +@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ 1.558 + 1.559 + while (*bp = *cp) 1.560 + if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { 1.561 ++#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR 1.562 ++ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); 1.563 ++#else 1.564 + if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { 1.565 + strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); 1.566 + } else { 1.567 + sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); 1.568 + } 1.569 ++#endif 1.570 + bp += strlen(bp); 1.571 + cp += 2; 1.572 + } else { 1.573 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 1.574 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600 1.575 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.576 +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ 1.577 + 1.578 + int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ 1.579 + 1.580 +-static jmp_buf timebuf; 1.581 ++static sigjmp_buf timebuf; 1.582 + 1.583 + /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ 1.584 + 1.585 +@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ 1.586 + static void timeout(sig) 1.587 + int sig; 1.588 + { 1.589 +- longjmp(timebuf, sig); 1.590 ++ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); 1.591 + } 1.592 + 1.593 + /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ 1.594 +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ 1.595 + * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. 1.596 + */ 1.597 + 1.598 +- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { 1.599 ++ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) { 1.600 + signal(SIGALRM, timeout); 1.601 + alarm(rfc931_timeout); 1.602 + 1.603 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 1.604 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 1.605 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.606 +@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ 1.607 ++.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" 1.608 ++.SH NAME 1.609 ++safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff 1.610 ++from finger servers 1.611 ++.SH SYNOPSIS 1.612 ++.B safe_finger [finger_options] 1.613 ++.SH DESCRIPTION 1.614 ++The 1.615 ++.B safe_finger 1.616 ++command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this 1.617 ++program for automatic reverse finger probes from the 1.618 ++.B tcp_wrapper 1.619 ++.B (tcpd) 1.620 ++, not the raw finger command. The 1.621 ++.B safe_finger 1.622 ++command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root 1.623 ++privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH 1.624 ++environment. 1.625 ++.B safe_finger 1.626 ++will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some 1.627 ++finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in 1.628 ++the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere 1.629 ++on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps 1.630 ++sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. 1.631 ++The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. 1.632 ++.B safe_finger 1.633 ++takes care of all this badness. 1.634 ++.SH SEE ALSO 1.635 ++.BR hosts_access (5), 1.636 ++.BR hosts_options (5), 1.637 ++.BR tcpd (8) 1.638 ++.SH AUTHOR 1.639 ++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. 1.640 ++ 1.641 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 1.642 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c 1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600 1.643 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.644 +@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ 1.645 + #include <stdio.h> 1.646 + #include <ctype.h> 1.647 + #include <pwd.h> 1.648 ++#include <syslog.h> 1.649 + 1.650 + extern void exit(); 1.651 + 1.652 + /* Local stuff */ 1.653 + 1.654 +-char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; 1.655 ++char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin"; 1.656 + 1.657 + #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ 1.658 + #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ 1.659 + #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ 1.660 + #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ 1.661 + #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ 1.662 +-#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ 1.663 ++#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */ 1.664 + 1.665 + int finger_pid; 1.666 ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; 1.667 ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; 1.668 + 1.669 + void cleanup(sig) 1.670 + int sig; 1.671 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 1.672 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600 1.673 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.674 +@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ 1.675 + 1.676 + /* ARGSUSED */ 1.677 + 1.678 +-void rfc931(request) 1.679 +-struct request_info *request; 1.680 ++void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) 1.681 ++struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; 1.682 ++struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; 1.683 ++char *dest; 1.684 + { 1.685 +- strcpy(request->user, unknown); 1.686 ++ strcpy(dest, unknown); 1.687 + } 1.688 + 1.689 + /* check_path - examine accessibility */ 1.690 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 1.691 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600 1.692 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.693 +@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ 1.694 + { 1.695 + static struct sockaddr_in client; 1.696 + static struct sockaddr_in server; 1.697 ++#if !defined (__GLIBC__) 1.698 + int len; 1.699 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.700 ++ size_t len; 1.701 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.702 + char buf[BUFSIZ]; 1.703 + int fd = request->fd; 1.704 + 1.705 +@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@ 1.706 + { 1.707 + char buf[BUFSIZ]; 1.708 + struct sockaddr_in sin; 1.709 ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) 1.710 + int size = sizeof(sin); 1.711 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.712 ++ size_t size = sizeof(sin); 1.713 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.714 + 1.715 + /* 1.716 + * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a 1.717 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 1.718 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600 1.719 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.720 +@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ 1.721 + .PP 1.722 + The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some 1.723 + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have 1.724 +-no `in.\' prefix to their name. 1.725 ++no `in.' prefix to their name. 1.726 + .SH EXAMPLE 2 1.727 + This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons 1.728 + are left in their original place. 1.729 +@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ 1.730 + becomes: 1.731 + .sp 1.732 + .ti +5 1.733 +-finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd 1.734 ++finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd 1.735 + .sp 1.736 + .fi 1.737 + .PP 1.738 + The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some 1.739 + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the 1.740 +-daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid 1.741 ++daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid 1.742 + field in the inetd configuration file. 1.743 + .PP 1.744 + Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be 1.745 +-covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) 1.746 ++covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) 1.747 + process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to 1.748 +-execute the `inetimp\' command. 1.749 ++execute the `inetimp' command. 1.750 + .SH EXAMPLE 3 1.751 + In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" 1.752 + or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it 1.753 + specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: 1.754 + .nf 1.755 + .sp 1.756 +- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd 1.757 ++ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd 1.758 + .sp 1.759 + .fi 1.760 + .PP 1.761 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 1.762 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600 1.763 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.764 +@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@ 1.765 + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. 1.766 + */ 1.767 + 1.768 ++#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H 1.769 ++#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H 1.770 ++ 1.771 ++/* someone else may have defined this */ 1.772 ++#undef __P 1.773 ++ 1.774 ++/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */ 1.775 ++#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus) 1.776 ++#define __P(args) args 1.777 ++#else 1.778 ++#define __P(args) () 1.779 ++#endif 1.780 ++ 1.781 ++/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */ 1.782 ++#include <netinet/in.h> 1.783 ++#include <stdio.h> 1.784 ++ 1.785 ++__BEGIN_DECLS 1.786 ++ 1.787 + /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ 1.788 + 1.789 + #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ 1.790 +@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@ 1.791 + char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ 1.792 + struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ 1.793 + struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ 1.794 +- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ 1.795 +- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ 1.796 +- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ 1.797 +- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ 1.798 ++ void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ 1.799 ++ void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */ 1.800 ++ void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */ 1.801 ++ void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */ 1.802 + struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ 1.803 + }; 1.804 + 1.805 +@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@ 1.806 + /* Global functions. */ 1.807 + 1.808 + #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) 1.809 +-extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */ 1.810 ++extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */ 1.811 + #else 1.812 + #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ 1.813 + #endif 1.814 + 1.815 +-extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ 1.816 +-extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ 1.817 +-extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */ 1.818 +-extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ 1.819 +-extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ 1.820 +-extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ 1.821 +-extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ 1.822 +-extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ 1.823 +-extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ 1.824 ++extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */ 1.825 ++extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */ 1.826 ++extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ 1.827 ++extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ 1.828 ++extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ 1.829 ++extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */ 1.830 ++extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */ 1.831 ++extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */ 1.832 + 1.833 + /* Global variables. */ 1.834 + 1.835 ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS 1.836 ++extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ 1.837 ++extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ 1.838 ++#else 1.839 + extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ 1.840 + extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ 1.841 ++#endif 1.842 ++ 1.843 + extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ 1.844 + extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ 1.845 + extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ 1.846 +@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@ 1.847 + */ 1.848 + 1.849 + #ifdef __STDC__ 1.850 ++extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); 1.851 ++extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, 1.852 ++ char *client_user); 1.853 + extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); 1.854 + extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); 1.855 + #else 1.856 ++extern int hosts_access(); 1.857 ++extern int hosts_ctl(); 1.858 + extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ 1.859 + extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ 1.860 + #endif 1.861 +@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@ 1.862 + * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. 1.863 + */ 1.864 + 1.865 +-extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ 1.866 +-extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ 1.867 +-extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ 1.868 +-extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ 1.869 +-extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ 1.870 +-extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ 1.871 ++extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */ 1.872 ++extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */ 1.873 ++extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */ 1.874 ++extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */ 1.875 ++extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ 1.876 ++extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ 1.877 + #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ 1.878 + #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ 1.879 + 1.880 + /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ 1.881 + 1.882 +-extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ 1.883 +-extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ 1.884 +-extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ 1.885 ++/* look up endpoint addresses */ 1.886 ++extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *)); 1.887 ++/* translate address to hostname */ 1.888 ++extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); 1.889 ++/* address to printable address */ 1.890 ++extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); 1.891 ++ 1.892 + #define sock_methods(r) \ 1.893 + { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } 1.894 + 1.895 + /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ 1.896 + 1.897 + #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) 1.898 +-extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ 1.899 ++extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ 1.900 + #endif 1.901 + 1.902 + /* 1.903 +@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ 1.904 + * behavior. 1.905 + */ 1.906 + 1.907 +-extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ 1.908 ++extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */ 1.909 + extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ 1.910 + 1.911 + /* Bug workarounds. */ 1.912 +@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@ 1.913 + #define strtok my_strtok 1.914 + extern char *my_strtok(); 1.915 + #endif 1.916 ++ 1.917 ++__END_DECLS 1.918 ++ 1.919 ++#endif /* tcpd.h */ 1.920 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 1.921 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600 1.922 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.923 +@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ 1.924 + { 1.925 + if (pat[0] == '@') { 1.926 + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); 1.927 ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { 1.928 ++ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); 1.929 + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { 1.930 + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); 1.931 + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { 1.932 +@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ 1.933 + { 1.934 + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ 1.935 + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); 1.936 ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { 1.937 ++ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); 1.938 + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { 1.939 + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); 1.940 + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { 1.941 +@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ 1.942 + static int check_host(pat) 1.943 + char *pat; 1.944 + { 1.945 ++ char buf[BUFSIZ]; 1.946 + char *mask; 1.947 + int addr_count = 1; 1.948 ++ FILE *fp; 1.949 ++ struct tcpd_context saved_context; 1.950 ++ char *cp; 1.951 ++ char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; 1.952 + 1.953 + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ 1.954 + #ifdef NO_NETGRENT 1.955 +@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ 1.956 + tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); 1.957 + #endif 1.958 + #endif 1.959 ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ 1.960 ++ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { 1.961 ++ saved_context = tcpd_context; 1.962 ++ tcpd_context.file = pat; 1.963 ++ tcpd_context.line = 0; 1.964 ++ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { 1.965 ++ tcpd_context.line++; 1.966 ++ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) 1.967 ++ check_host(cp); 1.968 ++ } 1.969 ++ tcpd_context = saved_context; 1.970 ++ fclose(fp); 1.971 ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { 1.972 ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); 1.973 ++ } 1.974 + } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ 1.975 + if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE 1.976 + || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) 1.977 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 1.978 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 1.979 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.980 +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ 1.981 ++.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" 1.982 ++.SH NAME 1.983 ++try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper 1.984 ++.SH SYNOPSIS 1.985 ++.B try-from 1.986 ++.SH DESCRIPTION 1.987 ++The 1.988 ++.B try-from 1.989 ++command can be called via a remote shell command to find out 1.990 ++if the hostname and address are properly recognized 1.991 ++by the 1.992 ++.B tcp_wrapper 1.993 ++library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI 1.994 ++on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through 1.995 ++.BR syslog (3) 1.996 ++and redirected to stderr. 1.997 ++ 1.998 ++Example: 1.999 ++ 1.1000 ++rsh host /some/where/try-from 1.1001 ++ 1.1002 ++.SH SEE ALSO 1.1003 ++.BR hosts_access (5), 1.1004 ++.BR hosts_options (5), 1.1005 ++.BR tcpd (8) 1.1006 ++.SH AUTHOR 1.1007 ++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. 1.1008 ++ 1.1009 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 1.1010 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 1.1011 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.1012 +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ 1.1013 ++ /* 1.1014 ++ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50 1.1015 ++ * 1.1016 ++ * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org> 1.1017 ++ */ 1.1018 ++ 1.1019 ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS 1.1020 ++#include <syslog.h> 1.1021 ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; 1.1022 ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; 1.1023 ++#endif 1.1024 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 1.1025 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c 1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600 1.1026 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 1.1027 +@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ 1.1028 + int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) 1.1029 + int sock; 1.1030 + struct sockaddr *sa; 1.1031 ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) 1.1032 + int *len; 1.1033 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.1034 ++size_t *len; 1.1035 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 1.1036 + { 1.1037 + int ret; 1.1038 + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;