wok-6.x rev 286
ADD: libwrap, libwrap-dev
| author | Eric Joseph-Alexandre <erjo@slitaz.org> |
|---|---|
| date | Wed Feb 27 16:38:56 2008 +0100 (2008-02-27) |
| parents | b19d783ba624 |
| children | 4b37234fc0be |
| files | libwrap-dev/receipt libwrap/receipt libwrap/stuff/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch |
line diff
1.1 --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 1.2 +++ b/libwrap-dev/receipt Wed Feb 27 16:38:56 2008 +0100 1.3 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ 1.4 +# SliTaz package receipt. 1.5 + 1.6 +PACKAGE="libwrap-dev" 1.7 +VERSION="7.6" 1.8 +CATEGORY="development" 1.9 +SHORT_DESC="Wietse Venema's network logger devel files." 1.10 +MAINTAINER="Erjo <erjo@slitaz.org>" 1.11 +WANTED="libwrap" 1.12 +WEB_SITE="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html" 1.13 + 1.14 +# Rules to gen a SliTaz package suitable for Tazpkg. 1.15 +genpkg_rules() 1.16 +{ 1.17 + src=$WOK/$WANTED/tcp_wrappers_${VERSION} 1.18 + mkdir -p $fs/usr/include $fs/usr/lib 1.19 + cp -a $src/tcpd.h $fs/usr/include 1.20 + cp -a $src/*.a $fs/usr/lib 1.21 +}
2.1 --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 2.2 +++ b/libwrap/receipt Wed Feb 27 16:38:56 2008 +0100 2.3 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ 2.4 +# SliTaz package receipt. 2.5 + 2.6 +PACKAGE="libwrap" 2.7 +VERSION="7.6" 2.8 +CATEGORY="system-tools" 2.9 +SHORT_DESC="Wietse Venema's network logger." 2.10 +MAINTAINER="Erjo <erjo@slitaz.org>" 2.11 +SOURCE="tcp_wrappers" 2.12 +TARBALL="${SOURCE}_${VERSION}.tar.gz" 2.13 +WEB_SITE="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html" 2.14 +WGET_URL="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/$TARBALL" 2.15 + 2.16 +# Rules to configure and make the package. 2.17 +compile_rules() 2.18 +{ 2.19 + src=$PWD/${SOURCE}_${VERSION} 2.20 + cd $src 2.21 + # Patch from Linux From Scratch 2.22 + patch -p1 -i ../stuff/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch 2.23 + sed -i -e "s,^extern char \*malloc();,/* & */," scaffold.c 2.24 + 2.25 + make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin STYLE=-DPROCESS_OPTIONS linux 2.26 +} 2.27 + 2.28 +# Rules to gen a SliTaz package suitable for Tazpkg. 2.29 +genpkg_rules() 2.30 +{ 2.31 + src=$PWD/${SOURCE}_${VERSION} 2.32 + mkdir -p $fs/usr/lib 2.33 + cp -a $src/shared/*.so* $fs/usr/lib 2.34 +} 2.35 + 2.36 +clean_wok() 2.37 +{ 2.38 + rm -rf $PWD/${SOURCE}_${VERSION} 2.39 +}
3.1 --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 3.2 +++ b/libwrap/stuff/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch Wed Feb 27 16:38:56 2008 +0100 3.3 @@ -0,0 +1,1035 @@ 3.4 +Submitted By: Tushar Teredesai <tushar@linuxfromscratch.org> 3.5 +Date: 2003-10-04 3.6 +Initial Package Version: 7.6 3.7 +Origin: http://archives.linuxfromscratch.org/mail-archives/blfs-dev/2003-January/001960.html 3.8 +Description: The patch was created from the tcp_wrappers modified package by Mark Heerdink. 3.9 +This patch provides the following improvements: 3.10 + * Install libwrap.so along with libwrap.a. 3.11 + * Create an install target for tcp_wrappers. 3.12 + * Compilation and security fixes. 3.13 + * Documentation fixes. 3.14 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 3.15 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600 3.16 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile 2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500 3.17 +@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ 3.18 ++GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h) 3.19 ++ 3.20 + # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20 3.21 + 3.22 ++# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable 3.23 ++HOSTNAME = 3.24 ++ 3.25 + what: 3.26 + @echo 3.27 + @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" 3.28 +@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ 3.29 + @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" 3.30 + @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" 3.31 + @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" 3.32 +- @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" 3.33 ++ @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" 3.34 + @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" 3.35 + @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" 3.36 + @echo " uts215 uxp" 3.37 +@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ 3.38 + # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx 3.39 + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc 3.40 + # 3.41 +-# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX 3.42 +-#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin 3.43 ++# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux 3.44 ++REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin 3.45 + # 3.46 + # BSD 4.4 3.47 + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec 3.48 +@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ 3.49 + LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ 3.50 + EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all 3.51 + 3.52 ++ifneq ($(GLIBC),0) 3.53 ++MYLIB=-lnsl 3.54 ++endif 3.55 ++ 3.56 + linux: 3.57 + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ 3.58 +- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ 3.59 +- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all 3.60 ++ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ 3.61 ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ 3.62 ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" 3.63 ++ 3.64 ++gnu: 3.65 ++ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ 3.66 ++ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ 3.67 ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ 3.68 ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" 3.69 + 3.70 + # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. 3.71 + hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: 3.72 +@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ 3.73 + # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module 3.74 + # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). 3.75 + 3.76 +-AUX_OBJ= setenv.o 3.77 ++#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o 3.78 + #AUX_OBJ= environ.o 3.79 + #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o 3.80 + 3.81 +@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ 3.82 + # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work 3.83 + # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. 3.84 + 3.85 +-BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK 3.86 ++BUGS = 3.87 ++#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK 3.88 + #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG 3.89 + #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG 3.90 + 3.91 +@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ 3.92 + # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following 3.93 + # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. 3.94 + # 3.95 +-#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP 3.96 ++NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP 3.97 + 3.98 + ############################################################### 3.99 + # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() 3.100 +@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ 3.101 + # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions 3.102 + # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). 3.103 + # 3.104 +-#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. 3.105 ++STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. 3.106 + 3.107 + ################################################################ 3.108 + # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records 3.109 +@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ 3.110 + # 3.111 + # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. 3.112 + 3.113 +-FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use 3.114 ++FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use 3.115 + 3.116 + # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. 3.117 + 3.118 +@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ 3.119 + # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname 3.120 + # lookups altogether, see the next section. 3.121 + 3.122 +-PARANOID= -DPARANOID 3.123 ++#PARANOID= -DPARANOID 3.124 + 3.125 + ######################################## 3.126 + # Optional: turning off hostname lookups 3.127 +@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ 3.128 + # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid 3.129 + # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. 3.130 + 3.131 +-HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME 3.132 ++#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME 3.133 + 3.134 + ############################################# 3.135 + # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking 3.136 +@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ 3.137 + # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, 3.138 + # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. 3.139 + # 3.140 +-# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS 3.141 ++KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS 3.142 + 3.143 + ## End configuration options 3.144 + ############################ 3.145 + 3.146 + # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. 3.147 + 3.148 ++CC = gcc 3.149 + SHELL = /bin/sh 3.150 +-.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c 3.151 ++.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c 3.152 ++ 3.153 ++SOMAJOR = 0 3.154 ++SOMINOR = 7.6 3.155 ++ 3.156 ++LIB = libwrap.a 3.157 ++SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) 3.158 ++SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) 3.159 ++SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so 3.160 ++SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap 3.161 + 3.162 +-CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ 3.163 ++shared/%.o: %.c 3.164 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ 3.165 ++ 3.166 ++CFLAGS = -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ 3.167 + $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ 3.168 + -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ 3.169 + -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ 3.170 + $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ 3.171 + $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) 3.172 + 3.173 ++SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) 3.174 ++SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT 3.175 ++ 3.176 + LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ 3.177 + hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ 3.178 + $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ 3.179 + update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o 3.180 + 3.181 ++SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ)); 3.182 ++ 3.183 + FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o 3.184 + 3.185 + KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ 3.186 +@@ -684,46 +719,80 @@ 3.187 + refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ 3.188 + scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS 3.189 + 3.190 +-LIB = libwrap.a 3.191 +- 3.192 +-all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk 3.193 ++all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) 3.194 + 3.195 + # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. 3.196 + 3.197 + config-check: 3.198 + @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } 3.199 +- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ 3.200 +- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ 3.201 +- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ 3.202 +- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ 3.203 ++ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ 3.204 ++ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ 3.205 ++ then rm cflags.new ; \ 3.206 ++ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ 3.207 + fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null 3.208 ++ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi 3.209 + 3.210 + $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) 3.211 + rm -f $(LIB) 3.212 + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) 3.213 + -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) 3.214 + 3.215 +-tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) 3.216 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 3.217 ++$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) 3.218 ++ rm -f $(SHLIB) 3.219 ++ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) 3.220 ++ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) 3.221 ++ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) 3.222 ++ 3.223 ++tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) 3.224 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 3.225 + 3.226 +-miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) 3.227 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 3.228 ++miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB) 3.229 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 3.230 + 3.231 +-safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) 3.232 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 3.233 ++safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) 3.234 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 3.235 + 3.236 + TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o 3.237 + 3.238 +-tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) 3.239 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) 3.240 ++tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) 3.241 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) 3.242 + 3.243 +-try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) 3.244 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) 3.245 ++try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) 3.246 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) 3.247 + 3.248 + TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o 3.249 + 3.250 +-tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) 3.251 +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) 3.252 ++tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) 3.253 ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) 3.254 ++ 3.255 ++install: install-lib install-bin install-dev 3.256 ++ 3.257 ++install-lib: 3.258 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ 3.259 ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) 3.260 ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO)) 3.261 ++ 3.262 ++install-bin: 3.263 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 3.264 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 3.265 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 3.266 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 3.267 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ 3.268 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 3.269 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 3.270 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 3.271 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 3.272 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ 3.273 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ 3.274 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ 3.275 ++ 3.276 ++install-dev: 3.277 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/ 3.278 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/ 3.279 ++ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ 3.280 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3 3.281 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3 3.282 ++ ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3 3.283 + 3.284 + shar: $(KIT) 3.285 + @shar $(KIT) 3.286 +@@ -739,7 +808,8 @@ 3.287 + 3.288 + clean: 3.289 + rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ 3.290 +- cflags 3.291 ++ cflags libwrap*.so* 3.292 ++ rm -rf shared 3.293 + 3.294 + tidy: clean 3.295 + chmod -R a+r . 3.296 +@@ -885,5 +955,6 @@ 3.297 + update.o: mystdarg.h 3.298 + update.o: tcpd.h 3.299 + vfprintf.o: cflags 3.300 ++weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h 3.301 + workarounds.o: cflags 3.302 + workarounds.o: tcpd.h 3.303 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 3.304 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500 3.305 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.306 +@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@ 3.307 + #ifdef IP_OPTIONS 3.308 + unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; 3.309 + char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; 3.310 ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) 3.311 + int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; 3.312 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.313 ++ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf); 3.314 ++ int ipproto; 3.315 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.316 + struct protoent *ip; 3.317 + int fd = request->fd; 3.318 + unsigned int opt; 3.319 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 3.320 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600 3.321 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.322 +@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ 3.323 + hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library 3.324 + .SH SYNOPSIS 3.325 + .nf 3.326 +-#include "tcpd.h" 3.327 ++#include <tcpd.h> 3.328 + 3.329 + extern int allow_severity; 3.330 + extern int deny_severity; 3.331 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 3.332 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600 3.333 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.334 +@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ 3.335 + impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a 3.336 + quick introduction. 3.337 + .PP 3.338 +-An extended version of the access control language is described in the 3.339 +-\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at 3.340 +-program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. 3.341 ++The extended version of the access control language is described in the 3.342 ++\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes 3.343 ++the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR 3.344 + .PP 3.345 + In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a 3.346 + network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of 3.347 +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ 3.348 + character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are 3.349 + easier to edit. 3.350 + .IP \(bu 3.351 +-Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. 3.352 ++Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored. 3.353 + This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables 3.354 + are easier to read. 3.355 + .IP \(bu 3.356 +@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ 3.357 + .SH PATTERNS 3.358 + The access control language implements the following patterns: 3.359 + .IP \(bu 3.360 +-A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if 3.361 ++A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if 3.362 + the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For 3.363 +-example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name 3.364 +-`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. 3.365 ++example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name 3.366 ++`wzv.win.tue.nl'. 3.367 + .IP \(bu 3.368 +-A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if 3.369 ++A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if 3.370 + its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the 3.371 +-pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the 3.372 ++pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the 3.373 + Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). 3.374 + .IP \(bu 3.375 +-A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS 3.376 ++A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS 3.377 + (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host 3.378 + member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported 3.379 + for daemon process names or for client user names. 3.380 + .IP \(bu 3.381 +-An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a 3.382 +-`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the 3.383 +-bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask 3.384 +-pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the 3.385 +-range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. 3.386 ++An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a 3.387 ++`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the 3.388 ++bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask 3.389 ++pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the 3.390 ++range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'. 3.391 ++.IP \(bu 3.392 ++A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file 3.393 ++name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name 3.394 ++or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is 3.395 ++zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns 3.396 ++separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere 3.397 ++a host name or address pattern can be used. 3.398 + .SH WILDCARDS 3.399 + The access control language supports explicit wildcards: 3.400 + .IP ALL 3.401 +@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ 3.402 + .ne 6 3.403 + .SH OPERATORS 3.404 + .IP EXCEPT 3.405 +-Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct 3.406 ++Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct 3.407 + matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches 3.408 + \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in 3.409 + client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control 3.410 +-language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' 3.411 +-would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. 3.412 ++language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' 3.413 ++would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'. 3.414 + .br 3.415 + .ne 6 3.416 + .SH SHELL COMMANDS 3.417 + If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that 3.418 + command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section). 3.419 + The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard 3.420 +-input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' 3.421 ++input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&' 3.422 + at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has 3.423 + completed. 3.424 + .PP 3.425 +@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ 3.426 + .IP %u 3.427 + The client user name (or "unknown"). 3.428 + .IP %% 3.429 +-Expands to a single `%\' character. 3.430 ++Expands to a single `%' character. 3.431 + .PP 3.432 + Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by 3.433 + underscores. 3.434 +@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ 3.435 + less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the 3.436 + client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much 3.437 + harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that 3.438 +-the client\'s IDENT server is lying. 3.439 ++the client's IDENT server is lying. 3.440 + .PP 3.441 +-Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. 3.442 ++Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. 3.443 + .SH EXAMPLES 3.444 + The language is flexible enough that different types of access control 3.445 + policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language 3.446 +@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ 3.447 + .br 3.448 + ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu 3.449 + .PP 3.450 +-The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' 3.451 ++The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.' 3.452 + in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP 3.453 + netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the 3.454 + \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of 3.455 +@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ 3.456 + /etc/hosts.deny: 3.457 + .in +3 3.458 + .nf 3.459 +-in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ 3.460 +- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & 3.461 ++in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ 3.462 ++ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) & 3.463 + .fi 3.464 + .PP 3.465 + The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be 3.466 +@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ 3.467 + capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not 3.468 + terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter> 3.469 + expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails 3.470 +-that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. 3.471 ++that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. 3.472 + .SH FILES 3.473 + .na 3.474 + .nf 3.475 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 3.476 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600 3.477 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.478 +@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ 3.479 + } 3.480 + } 3.481 + 3.482 ++/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ 3.483 ++ 3.484 ++static int hostfile_match(path, host) 3.485 ++char *path; 3.486 ++struct hosts_info *host; 3.487 ++{ 3.488 ++ char tok[BUFSIZ]; 3.489 ++ int match = NO; 3.490 ++ FILE *fp; 3.491 ++ 3.492 ++ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { 3.493 ++ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) 3.494 ++ /* void */ ; 3.495 ++ fclose(fp); 3.496 ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { 3.497 ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); 3.498 ++ } 3.499 ++ return (match); 3.500 ++} 3.501 ++ 3.502 + /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ 3.503 + 3.504 + static int host_match(tok, host) 3.505 +@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ 3.506 + tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ 3.507 + return (NO); 3.508 + #endif 3.509 ++ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ 3.510 ++ return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); 3.511 + } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ 3.512 + char *name = eval_hostname(host); 3.513 + return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); 3.514 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 3.515 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600 3.516 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.517 +@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ 3.518 + Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after 3.519 + performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5) 3.520 + manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr 3.521 +-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the 3.522 ++connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the 3.523 + conversation with the client host. Example: 3.524 + .sp 3.525 + .nf 3.526 + .ti +3 3.527 +-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & 3.528 ++spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) & 3.529 + .fi 3.530 + .sp 3.531 + executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger 3.532 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 3.533 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c 1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600 3.534 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.535 +@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ 3.536 + #ifdef LOG_CRON 3.537 + "cron", LOG_CRON, 3.538 + #endif 3.539 ++#ifdef LOG_FTP 3.540 ++ "ftp", LOG_FTP, 3.541 ++#endif 3.542 + #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 3.543 + "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, 3.544 + #endif 3.545 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 3.546 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c 1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600 3.547 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.548 +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ 3.549 + #include <string.h> 3.550 + 3.551 + extern int errno; 3.552 +-#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED 3.553 ++#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) 3.554 + extern char *sys_errlist[]; 3.555 + extern int sys_nerr; 3.556 + #endif 3.557 +@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ 3.558 + 3.559 + while (*bp = *cp) 3.560 + if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { 3.561 ++#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR 3.562 ++ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); 3.563 ++#else 3.564 + if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { 3.565 + strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); 3.566 + } else { 3.567 + sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); 3.568 + } 3.569 ++#endif 3.570 + bp += strlen(bp); 3.571 + cp += 2; 3.572 + } else { 3.573 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 3.574 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600 3.575 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.576 +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ 3.577 + 3.578 + int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ 3.579 + 3.580 +-static jmp_buf timebuf; 3.581 ++static sigjmp_buf timebuf; 3.582 + 3.583 + /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ 3.584 + 3.585 +@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ 3.586 + static void timeout(sig) 3.587 + int sig; 3.588 + { 3.589 +- longjmp(timebuf, sig); 3.590 ++ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); 3.591 + } 3.592 + 3.593 + /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ 3.594 +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ 3.595 + * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. 3.596 + */ 3.597 + 3.598 +- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { 3.599 ++ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) { 3.600 + signal(SIGALRM, timeout); 3.601 + alarm(rfc931_timeout); 3.602 + 3.603 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 3.604 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 3.605 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.606 +@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ 3.607 ++.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" 3.608 ++.SH NAME 3.609 ++safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff 3.610 ++from finger servers 3.611 ++.SH SYNOPSIS 3.612 ++.B safe_finger [finger_options] 3.613 ++.SH DESCRIPTION 3.614 ++The 3.615 ++.B safe_finger 3.616 ++command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this 3.617 ++program for automatic reverse finger probes from the 3.618 ++.B tcp_wrapper 3.619 ++.B (tcpd) 3.620 ++, not the raw finger command. The 3.621 ++.B safe_finger 3.622 ++command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root 3.623 ++privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH 3.624 ++environment. 3.625 ++.B safe_finger 3.626 ++will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some 3.627 ++finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in 3.628 ++the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere 3.629 ++on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps 3.630 ++sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. 3.631 ++The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. 3.632 ++.B safe_finger 3.633 ++takes care of all this badness. 3.634 ++.SH SEE ALSO 3.635 ++.BR hosts_access (5), 3.636 ++.BR hosts_options (5), 3.637 ++.BR tcpd (8) 3.638 ++.SH AUTHOR 3.639 ++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. 3.640 ++ 3.641 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 3.642 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c 1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600 3.643 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.644 +@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ 3.645 + #include <stdio.h> 3.646 + #include <ctype.h> 3.647 + #include <pwd.h> 3.648 ++#include <syslog.h> 3.649 + 3.650 + extern void exit(); 3.651 + 3.652 + /* Local stuff */ 3.653 + 3.654 +-char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; 3.655 ++char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin"; 3.656 + 3.657 + #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ 3.658 + #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ 3.659 + #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ 3.660 + #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ 3.661 + #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ 3.662 +-#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ 3.663 ++#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */ 3.664 + 3.665 + int finger_pid; 3.666 ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; 3.667 ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; 3.668 + 3.669 + void cleanup(sig) 3.670 + int sig; 3.671 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 3.672 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600 3.673 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.674 +@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ 3.675 + 3.676 + /* ARGSUSED */ 3.677 + 3.678 +-void rfc931(request) 3.679 +-struct request_info *request; 3.680 ++void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) 3.681 ++struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; 3.682 ++struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; 3.683 ++char *dest; 3.684 + { 3.685 +- strcpy(request->user, unknown); 3.686 ++ strcpy(dest, unknown); 3.687 + } 3.688 + 3.689 + /* check_path - examine accessibility */ 3.690 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 3.691 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600 3.692 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.693 +@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ 3.694 + { 3.695 + static struct sockaddr_in client; 3.696 + static struct sockaddr_in server; 3.697 ++#if !defined (__GLIBC__) 3.698 + int len; 3.699 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.700 ++ size_t len; 3.701 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.702 + char buf[BUFSIZ]; 3.703 + int fd = request->fd; 3.704 + 3.705 +@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@ 3.706 + { 3.707 + char buf[BUFSIZ]; 3.708 + struct sockaddr_in sin; 3.709 ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) 3.710 + int size = sizeof(sin); 3.711 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.712 ++ size_t size = sizeof(sin); 3.713 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.714 + 3.715 + /* 3.716 + * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a 3.717 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 3.718 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600 3.719 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.720 +@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ 3.721 + .PP 3.722 + The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some 3.723 + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have 3.724 +-no `in.\' prefix to their name. 3.725 ++no `in.' prefix to their name. 3.726 + .SH EXAMPLE 2 3.727 + This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons 3.728 + are left in their original place. 3.729 +@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ 3.730 + becomes: 3.731 + .sp 3.732 + .ti +5 3.733 +-finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd 3.734 ++finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd 3.735 + .sp 3.736 + .fi 3.737 + .PP 3.738 + The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some 3.739 + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the 3.740 +-daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid 3.741 ++daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid 3.742 + field in the inetd configuration file. 3.743 + .PP 3.744 + Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be 3.745 +-covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) 3.746 ++covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) 3.747 + process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to 3.748 +-execute the `inetimp\' command. 3.749 ++execute the `inetimp' command. 3.750 + .SH EXAMPLE 3 3.751 + In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" 3.752 + or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it 3.753 + specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: 3.754 + .nf 3.755 + .sp 3.756 +- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd 3.757 ++ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd 3.758 + .sp 3.759 + .fi 3.760 + .PP 3.761 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 3.762 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600 3.763 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.764 +@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@ 3.765 + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. 3.766 + */ 3.767 + 3.768 ++#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H 3.769 ++#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H 3.770 ++ 3.771 ++/* someone else may have defined this */ 3.772 ++#undef __P 3.773 ++ 3.774 ++/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */ 3.775 ++#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus) 3.776 ++#define __P(args) args 3.777 ++#else 3.778 ++#define __P(args) () 3.779 ++#endif 3.780 ++ 3.781 ++/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */ 3.782 ++#include <netinet/in.h> 3.783 ++#include <stdio.h> 3.784 ++ 3.785 ++__BEGIN_DECLS 3.786 ++ 3.787 + /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ 3.788 + 3.789 + #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ 3.790 +@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@ 3.791 + char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ 3.792 + struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ 3.793 + struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ 3.794 +- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ 3.795 +- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ 3.796 +- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ 3.797 +- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ 3.798 ++ void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ 3.799 ++ void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */ 3.800 ++ void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */ 3.801 ++ void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */ 3.802 + struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ 3.803 + }; 3.804 + 3.805 +@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@ 3.806 + /* Global functions. */ 3.807 + 3.808 + #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) 3.809 +-extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */ 3.810 ++extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */ 3.811 + #else 3.812 + #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ 3.813 + #endif 3.814 + 3.815 +-extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ 3.816 +-extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ 3.817 +-extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */ 3.818 +-extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ 3.819 +-extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ 3.820 +-extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ 3.821 +-extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ 3.822 +-extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ 3.823 +-extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ 3.824 ++extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */ 3.825 ++extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */ 3.826 ++extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ 3.827 ++extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ 3.828 ++extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ 3.829 ++extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */ 3.830 ++extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */ 3.831 ++extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */ 3.832 + 3.833 + /* Global variables. */ 3.834 + 3.835 ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS 3.836 ++extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ 3.837 ++extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ 3.838 ++#else 3.839 + extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ 3.840 + extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ 3.841 ++#endif 3.842 ++ 3.843 + extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ 3.844 + extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ 3.845 + extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ 3.846 +@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@ 3.847 + */ 3.848 + 3.849 + #ifdef __STDC__ 3.850 ++extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); 3.851 ++extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, 3.852 ++ char *client_user); 3.853 + extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); 3.854 + extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); 3.855 + #else 3.856 ++extern int hosts_access(); 3.857 ++extern int hosts_ctl(); 3.858 + extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ 3.859 + extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ 3.860 + #endif 3.861 +@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@ 3.862 + * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. 3.863 + */ 3.864 + 3.865 +-extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ 3.866 +-extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ 3.867 +-extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ 3.868 +-extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ 3.869 +-extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ 3.870 +-extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ 3.871 ++extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */ 3.872 ++extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */ 3.873 ++extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */ 3.874 ++extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */ 3.875 ++extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ 3.876 ++extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ 3.877 + #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ 3.878 + #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ 3.879 + 3.880 + /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ 3.881 + 3.882 +-extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ 3.883 +-extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ 3.884 +-extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ 3.885 ++/* look up endpoint addresses */ 3.886 ++extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *)); 3.887 ++/* translate address to hostname */ 3.888 ++extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); 3.889 ++/* address to printable address */ 3.890 ++extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); 3.891 ++ 3.892 + #define sock_methods(r) \ 3.893 + { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } 3.894 + 3.895 + /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ 3.896 + 3.897 + #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) 3.898 +-extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ 3.899 ++extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ 3.900 + #endif 3.901 + 3.902 + /* 3.903 +@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ 3.904 + * behavior. 3.905 + */ 3.906 + 3.907 +-extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ 3.908 ++extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */ 3.909 + extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ 3.910 + 3.911 + /* Bug workarounds. */ 3.912 +@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@ 3.913 + #define strtok my_strtok 3.914 + extern char *my_strtok(); 3.915 + #endif 3.916 ++ 3.917 ++__END_DECLS 3.918 ++ 3.919 ++#endif /* tcpd.h */ 3.920 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 3.921 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600 3.922 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.923 +@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ 3.924 + { 3.925 + if (pat[0] == '@') { 3.926 + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); 3.927 ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { 3.928 ++ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); 3.929 + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { 3.930 + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); 3.931 + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { 3.932 +@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ 3.933 + { 3.934 + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ 3.935 + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); 3.936 ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { 3.937 ++ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); 3.938 + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { 3.939 + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); 3.940 + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { 3.941 +@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ 3.942 + static int check_host(pat) 3.943 + char *pat; 3.944 + { 3.945 ++ char buf[BUFSIZ]; 3.946 + char *mask; 3.947 + int addr_count = 1; 3.948 ++ FILE *fp; 3.949 ++ struct tcpd_context saved_context; 3.950 ++ char *cp; 3.951 ++ char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; 3.952 + 3.953 + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ 3.954 + #ifdef NO_NETGRENT 3.955 +@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ 3.956 + tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); 3.957 + #endif 3.958 + #endif 3.959 ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ 3.960 ++ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { 3.961 ++ saved_context = tcpd_context; 3.962 ++ tcpd_context.file = pat; 3.963 ++ tcpd_context.line = 0; 3.964 ++ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { 3.965 ++ tcpd_context.line++; 3.966 ++ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) 3.967 ++ check_host(cp); 3.968 ++ } 3.969 ++ tcpd_context = saved_context; 3.970 ++ fclose(fp); 3.971 ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { 3.972 ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); 3.973 ++ } 3.974 + } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ 3.975 + if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE 3.976 + || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) 3.977 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 3.978 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 3.979 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.980 +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ 3.981 ++.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" 3.982 ++.SH NAME 3.983 ++try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper 3.984 ++.SH SYNOPSIS 3.985 ++.B try-from 3.986 ++.SH DESCRIPTION 3.987 ++The 3.988 ++.B try-from 3.989 ++command can be called via a remote shell command to find out 3.990 ++if the hostname and address are properly recognized 3.991 ++by the 3.992 ++.B tcp_wrapper 3.993 ++library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI 3.994 ++on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through 3.995 ++.BR syslog (3) 3.996 ++and redirected to stderr. 3.997 ++ 3.998 ++Example: 3.999 ++ 3.1000 ++rsh host /some/where/try-from 3.1001 ++ 3.1002 ++.SH SEE ALSO 3.1003 ++.BR hosts_access (5), 3.1004 ++.BR hosts_options (5), 3.1005 ++.BR tcpd (8) 3.1006 ++.SH AUTHOR 3.1007 ++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. 3.1008 ++ 3.1009 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 3.1010 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 3.1011 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.1012 +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ 3.1013 ++ /* 3.1014 ++ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50 3.1015 ++ * 3.1016 ++ * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org> 3.1017 ++ */ 3.1018 ++ 3.1019 ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS 3.1020 ++#include <syslog.h> 3.1021 ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; 3.1022 ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; 3.1023 ++#endif 3.1024 +diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 3.1025 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c 1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600 3.1026 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c 2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600 3.1027 +@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ 3.1028 + int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) 3.1029 + int sock; 3.1030 + struct sockaddr *sa; 3.1031 ++#if !defined(__GLIBC__) 3.1032 + int *len; 3.1033 ++#else /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.1034 ++size_t *len; 3.1035 ++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ 3.1036 + { 3.1037 + int ret; 3.1038 + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;